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Abstract

Widespread Chinese social media applications such as Sina Weibo (Chinese Twitter), the most popular social network in China, are widely known for monitoring and
deleting posts to conform to Chinese government requirements. Censorship of Chinese social media is a complex process that involves many factors. There are multiple
stakeholders and many different interests: economic, political, legal, personal, etc.,
which means that there is not a single strategy dictated by a single government authority. Moreover, sometimes Chinese social media do not follow the directives of
government, out of concern that they are more strictly censoring than their competitors.
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One crucial question in this context to answer is: What kinds of features lead to a
given post being likely to be censored? Previous work trying to answer this question
(1) ignores the multi-modal nature of social networks and only focuses on the text
content, and (2) relies on narrow datasets collected by tracking small number of users
over a few months rather than years. Thus, these approaches produce results that
are limited and biased toward whatever was trending.
My thesis: Censors pay the most attention to these factors: the user who has
posted the content, number of reposts, and the sentiment of the text content than
other factors, with the first factor being the strongest. I attempt to support this
thesis by using data mining techniques to uncover censors’ policies and priorities in
Chinese social networks, specifically Sina Weibo. I take a multi-modal approach that
takes text content, image content, metadata and other factors, e.g., sentiment, into
account. The goals of my thesis are to: 1) investigate how different factors such as
text, image, and metadata, etc., correlate with censorship, and how consistently and
quickly different topics are censored, 2) determine to what extent censorship is based
on the person being posted about, 3) determine to what extent censorship is based
on the person posting the post, and 4) predict censorship by considering all available
information.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Human monitoring of social media posts and the subsequent deletion of posts that
are considered sensitive is only one aspect of Internet censorship. However, it is an
important one for academic study because seeing a post that is posted and then removed by the censors gives a lot of information to researchers, including the content
that was being posted and the amount of time it was visible before being deleted.
This can provide insights into the censors’ policies and priorities. A better understanding of censors’ motivations can lead to more effective ways of addressing Internet
censorship, be they technical, political, legal, economic, or otherwise.
Censorship of Chinese social media is a complex process that involves many factors. There are multiple stakeholders and many different interests: economic, political, legal, personal, etc., which means that there is not a single strategy dictated
by a single government authority [36]. Moreover, sometimes Chinese social media
do not follow the directives of the government, out of concern that they are more
strictly censoring than their competitors [36].
Past literature in this area has attempted to make general statements about what
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kinds of features lead to a given post being likely to be censored. Researchers have
posited the topic of a post (e.g., what keywords it contains) [19, 57], how viral or
popular the post is (e.g., how much it is reposted and commented on) [57], the
collective action potential (how likely it is to lead to collective action) [29], and
the individual posting the content [37] as major features that determine how high
of a priority deleting the post is to the censors. However, no study to date has
considered the multimodal nature of social media, and past studies have relied on
relatively narrow datatsets (e.g., spanning months rather than years or only following
a small set of users).
In this dissertation, we focus on Sina Weibo to uncover its censorship mechanisms.
Sina Weibo is one of the most popular social media platforms in China (“Weibo”
means “microblog” in Chinese). After the Urumqi riots [3], Chinese authorities shut
down all social media platforms including Twitter, Facebook, and local social media
platforms. Sina Weibo was designed as a new social media platform that would
control content of posts and would block content that does not comply with the
Chinese government’s requirements. As of July 2018, Weibo has over 441 million
active users, which surpasses Twitter’s 339 million active users [8]. Weibo provides
microblogging services similar to Twitter. Users can re-post and follow other users,
mention other people with @UserName, and add hashtags using #HashName#.
In this dissertation, we analyze more than 128,000 censored and uncensored posts
on Weibo to uncover censors’ policies and priorities. As opposed to previous work,
we take a multi-modal approach and take into account both image and text content
of posts. We investigate (1) how different factors correlate with censorship,
(2) how consistently and how quickly different topics are censored, (3) to
what extent censorship is based on the person being posted about, (4)
to what extent censorship is based on the person posting the post and
(5) how accurately a machine learning model can predict censorship and
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from where its prediction power derived.
In summary, our major contributions are:

1. We build image and text classifiers to classify posts into 14 categories that
have the potential to be censored in Weibo. Then we assess post monitoring
and deletion in Sina Weibo by exploring factors that could play a role in post
deletion across these categories.
2. We propose a multi-modal identity detection system to extract all identities
from censored/uncensored posts. Then we analyze how different identities or
groups of people are treated in terms of censorship. We perform extensive
statistical analysis to explore the factors that correlate with censorship.
3. We build a machine learning model that can predict censorship in Weibo with
76% accuracy.

1.1

Dissertation overview

In Chapter 2, we give an overview of related work in censorship in Chinese social
networks, specifically Sina Weibo. This includes text censorship and image censorship in different Chinese social platforms. It also includes previous work that tried
to predict censorship.
In Chapter 3, we describe the dataset that we aim to analyze, WeiboScope,
throughout this dissertation. We also give an overview of deep learning and CNN
localization. In Chapter 4, we present our research on categorizing the WeiboScope
dataset (based on both image and text content) into 14 categories that have the potential to be censored. It also includes our statistical analysis over the 14 categorizes
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of data. We found that sentiment is the strongest indicator of censorship
across all categories [16, 38].
In Chapter 5, we extend our work in Chapter 4 to extract all identities from
censored and uncensored posts and then categorize recognized identities based on
their occupation. In this way, we extract categories that arise from the dataset, as
opposed to hand picking categories, as in Chapter 4, based on domain knowledge.
We also took into account the user who has posted the content in our statistical analysis. We found that the user who has posted the content is the strongest
indicator of censorship across all categories.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we used survival analysis for analyzing the categorized
data, and only used supervised learning for speeding up manual processes such as
sorting images into categories. In Chapter 5, we used unsupervised learning for face
clustering. The work in Chapters 4 and 5 raised the question of if we could build a
classifier to predict censorship with high accuracy. Thus we built a classifier to do
so in Chapter 6, which is the only attempt in this dissertation to classify posts as
censored vs. not censored.
In Chapter 6, we also investigate which variables give the model the highest predictive power. We built a classifier that can predict censorship with 76.29%
accuracy. We found that sentiment of the text, number of reposts and
some specific N-grams are the most important features for the classifier,
with the first one having the highest impact compared to other features.
We also found that the most important N-gram features to the classifier
are those related to politics, e.g., “Corruption”, or politician names, e.g.,
“Bo Xilai”.
Finally, we conclude the dissertation in Chapter 7 and provide some potential
future research directions.
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Related Work

Researchers have studied China’s censorship mechanisms in the IP layer [24, 26, 48,
58, 43], in the application layer [47, 45], on blog platforms [21, 29, 34], and on search
engines [46, 56]. These are all important aspects of a much broader picture. What
makes the monitoring and subsequent deletion of posts on social media interesting
is what it affords researchers in terms of data, especially what the user was trying
to post and metadata such as how popular/viral the post was and timestamp information. We categorize the related work in censorship of Chinese social media into
three main categories:

• Text content only: Related work that only focuses on the text content.

• Image content: Related work that considers image content.

• Predicting censorship: Related work that tries to predict censorship.
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2.1

Text content only

Chinese social networks are popular and previous researchers have attempted to
study their censorship mechanisms. King et al. [29] collected a dataset of censored
blog posts, by checking for the deleted posts every 24 hours, over six months in
2011. Using that dataset, they identified the collective action potential of posts as
a major indicator of censorship. Bamman et al. [19] used a dataset collected over
three months in 2011 from Sina Weibo, and performed a statistical analysis of deleted
posts and showed that posts with some sensitive words are more likely to be deleted.
They also explored geographic patterns in censorship and depicted that posts from
some specific provinces, i.e., Tibet and Qinghai, experience a higher censorship rate
compared to other provinces. WeiboScope [28] collects deleted posts from Weibo
and follows all users with a high number of followers, and then measures the deletion
events.
Zhu et al. [57] collected a dataset of censored posts from Sina Weibo by tracking
3,567 users over three months in 2012. They investigated how quickly, on a scale of
minutes, posts in Weibo are removed. They also performed a logistic regression over
censored data only to analyze the interaction of different factors, by not considering
sentiment and topics, and showed that whether a post contains an image has the
highest impact on censorship. They also showed that there is a correlation between
how many posts a user had had deleted and how quickly their posts were deleted,
but stopped short of comparing this to other factors.
Recently Miller et al. [37] analyzed a dataset of internal censorship logs from
Sina Weibo. Their dataset contains about 8K logs from 2011-2014, but they only
analyzed 1412 logs from 2012 to limit the analysis to a single year under the HuWen Administration. They used a logistic regression to analyze these logs. Their
dependent variable is “report user”, and they consider only 3 content-based indepen-
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dent variables based on domain knowledge (collective action, government criticism,
and local government corruption), and 7 instruction-based independent variables
(User Attributes, Political humor, Government attack, Rumors, etc.). Then they
manually label these logs based on these 10 variables using 2 human coders (their
inter-reliability rate is higher than 70% most of the time). Finally they show that
user attributes (fans and follower counts, big/small user, media user, foreign user,
verified user, etc.) is the strongest indicator whether the user is instructed to be
reported up or not.

2.2

Image content

To the best of our knowledge there is no prior work that has studied image censorship
in Weibo, but there are some previous works that have studied WeChat, the most
popular chat application in China. Crete-Nishihata et. al. [27] discovered WeChat
image censorship for the first time in individual chats, in addition to group chats
after the death of Liu Xiaobo. Since his demise, Sina Weibo also keeps a ban on
searches for Liu Xiaobo.
Recently Knockel et. al. [31] investigated image censorship mechanisms in WeChat.
They indicated that WeChat utilizes two image filtering algorithms: i) an Optical
Character Recognition (OCR)-based algorithm to censor sensitive text, ii) a visualbased algorithm to censor images visually similar to images in an image blacklist.
They also examined both algorithms and introduced ways to evade image filters. As
the OCR filter converts images to grayscale and performs blob merging, two effective ways to evade OCR-based filters are by hiding the text inside the image hue and
hiding text using a large number of blobs. As visual-based algorithms never learn
the high-level semantics of images, simply mirroring or rotating the images, changing
the aspect ratio, or modifying the borders based on the dimension of an image can
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evade the filter.

2.3

Predicting censorship in Weibo

Ng et. al [39] built a Naive Bayes classifier over 344 censored and uncensored posts
from Sina Weibo to classify posts from only one category: the Bo Xilai scandal.
They explored whether linguistic features in a post play any role in censorship and
indicated that posts with subjective content, e.g., expressions of mood and feeling,
are likely to be censored. Ng et. al [40] collected 2,171 censored and uncensored
posts from 7 categories and built a text classifier based on linguistic features (e.g.,
sentiment) to predict censorship. They indicated that the strongest linguistic feature
in censored posts is readability.
However, no study to date has considered the multimodal nature of social
media, and past studies have relied on relatively narrow datatsets (e.g.,
spanning months rather than years or only following a small set of users).
In this dissertation, we use the Weiboscope dataset, which tracks 120,000 users
over 4 years (2015-2018) in Sina Weibo and includes 128,044 posts, of which 64,022
were censored. We also take a multi-modal approach and take into account both
image and text content of posts.
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Background
In this Chapter, we describe the dataset under study of this dissertation, and provide
background information on deep learning and CNN localization.

3.1

WeiboScope dataset

WeiboScope tracks about 120,000 users from three samples:

1. User accounts with high going-viral potential, measured by the number of followers.
2. A group of accounts whose posts are known to have a high likelihood to be
censored, such as individual media, NGOs, human rights lawyers, grassroots
leaders, or key opinion leaders, etc.
3. A random sample of accounts generated by randomly selecting users’ unique
identity codes.

9
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By following the tracked users as “friends”, the user’s recently modified timeline
is compared to the previous version, every 20 minutes, to discover if any posts had
been deleted. When a post is missing, Weibo returns two possible messages: “weibo
does not exist” or “permission denied”. The latter is returned when the censors
make the post inaccessible to others, and the former message is returned when the
user voluntarily deletes the post or the censors remove it entirely. Since there is no
feasible way to determine who deleted a post, we only consider posts deleted by a
“permission denied” message to be censored. Thus the scope of our work in this
dissertation is the censorship mechanisms resulting in “permission denied” message.
From January 2015 through April 2018, WeiboScope collected 64,022 censored
and more than 40 million uncensored posts by tracking the above-mentioned users.
We know that these posts are uncensored since they were not deleted by the censor or
the user. In this dissertation, we had to start with a 40M dataset to find 64K censored
posts. Including all the 40M uncensored posts from this vast starting dataset is
infeasible. Therefore we randomly chose 64,022 uncensored post to have the same
base rate. Thus the reduced WeiboScope dataset that we study in this dissertation
has 64,022 censored posts and 64,022 uncensored posts from 2015 through 2018.
It is worth mentioning that many of the censored posts might be censored only because of the text, and not the images in the posts. In other words, some images cause
censorship while others merely co-appear with it. Some images may contribute to
the decision to censor but aren’t sufficient on their own to warrant it. Sometimes the
images might not be offensive enough on its own to trigger censorship, other times it
is just because the censor has bigger problems to worry about and would have censored it if he had the time. Thus the censored images in these datasets include a very
diverse spectrum of images, such as images of sunsets, images of foods and fruits,
and images of text screenshots. This diversity of images makes it very challenging
to extract images related to potentially sensitive topics from this dataset.
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3.2

Deep learning and CNN localization

Deep learning has significantly improved the state of the art in many different artificial intelligence tasks such as face recognition, object detection, and speech recognition [33]. A convolutional neural network (CNN) is a class of deep learning that is
mostly applied to visual imagery. A CNN has an input and an output and multiple
hidden layers. The hidden layers are typically convolutional layers. A convolutional
layer applies a convolutional operation to the input and passes the result to the next
layer. CNNs can learn to solve complex tasks without the human effort to manually
perform feature extraction, which is a major advantage over other methods.
In a CNN, each layer is responsible for learning one or more features of the image
and transforms the input data or the data from the previous layer into a slightly
more complex representation. For example, in a face recognition application, the
input which is an image is represented as a matrix of pixels. The way that a deep
network works is that the first hidden layer may detect the edges in the image (e.g.,
horizontal, vertical or diagonal edges); the second layer is able to detect more complex
shapes like curves or circles; and so on. Finally, the deeper layers may combine these
basic shapes and detect more complex parts like noses, eyes or other face landmarks;
and the last hidden layer can combine these landmarks and detect the face/faces in
the image. Therefore, as the network gets deeper, it is more capable of recognizing
more complex objects more effectively [20].
CNNs have drastically improved the performance of different visual recognition
tasks [32, 55]. In an object classification problem one tries to identify whether the
image presents an object, while in the object localization problem one tries to find the
location of an object in the image. It has been shown that CNNs are able to handle
both tasks at the same time: they can both classify images and localize class-specific
objects in the images [23, 41].
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Multi-modal Classification of Hot
Categories
In this chapter, we1 assess post monitoring and post deletion based on Weibo. We
focus on Sina Weibo and use the reduced Weiboscope dataset [28] described in Section 3.1, which tracks 120,000 users over 4 years (2015–2018) in Sina Weibo and
includes 128,044 posts, of which 64,022 were censored. The WeiboScope dataset has
only two categories, censored and uncensored, and does not include the reason for
censorship. In particular, this dataset is not labeled by categories and it is very
time-consuming to manually categorize them.
We identify fourteen categories that both (1) saw a significant amount of censorship in the WeiboScope dataset; and, (2) could be identified through both images
and text. To analyze the dataset we take a multi-modal approach that takes into
account both text and images that appear in posts. We then test the effect of vari1I

use “we” instead of “I” in this and following chapters since they are collaborative

work.

12

Chapter 4. Multi-modal Classification of Hot Categories

ous factors that may affect censorship that were identified by past literature on the
lifetime of posts.
To analyze the reduced WeiboScope dataset, we take a semi-automated multimodal approach and utilize deep learning, CNN localization, and NLP techniques.
To train our image and text classifiers, we first collected our own image and text
datasets from 14 interesting categories that are potential categories for censorship
on Weibo and any other social media platforms in China. We refer to the image
dataset as CCTI14 (Chinese Censored Topics Images), and to the text dataset as
CCTT14 (Chinese Censored Topics Text) 2 . After training classifiers with CCTI14
and CCTT14, we categorize the WeiboScope dataset into our 14 categories.
These categories are selected based on previous research, domain knowledge, and
known censorship events in China. CCTI14 has 18,966 labeled images and CCTT14
has 994 labeled texts from 14 categories as well as an “Other” category. These
categories are as follows (in alphabetical order): 1) Bo Xilai, 2) Deng Xiaoping, 3)
Fire, 4) Injury/Dead, 5) Liu Xiaobo, 6) Mao Zedong, 7) People’s congress, 8) Policeman/Military forces, 9) Protest, 10) Prurient/Nudity, 11) Rainstorm, 12) Winnie
the Pooh, 13) Xi Jinping, 14) Zhou Kehua.
We trained an image classifier over the CCTI14 dataset using the VGG network [44] and it achieved a 97% F1-score. We also trained a text classifier over the
CCTT14 dataset that achieved a 95% F1-score. We used our classifiers to classify
both censored and uncensored posts from the reduced WeiboScope dataset under
study into the above-mentioned 14 categories. Because of a flag in the Weibo API,
we can distinguish between deletions by a post’s author and by the Weibo system
itself, providing ground truth for which posts have been censored.
We found that sentiment is the only indicator of censorship that is consistent
2 Github:

https://github.com/weibocensorship/weibo
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across the variety of categories we identified. We also found that most of the categories (e.g., protest) are often censored, whereas some categories (e.g., rainstorm)
are less frequently censored. This suggests that different categories can be censored
with different levels of consistency.
We also found that the median lifetime of the posts that were censored in a
category is less than three hours on average, which confirms that censors can quickly
delete sensitive posts.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to look at both text and image
content of posts being censored and not just at the text content. We hope that our
datasets, CCTI14 and CCTT14, which are the first datasets labeled by categories
assembled for studying China’s censorship, can help other researchers to uncover
image and text censorship mechanisms in other social media platforms in China,
and that our techniques can be applied in other contexts.
In summary, this chapter presents the following contributions:
• We introduce CCTI14 and CCTT14, the first image and text datasets labeled
by categories assembled specifically for studying image and text censorship in
Chinese social media.
• We train a CNN model over CCTI14 that achieves a 97% F1-score, and a text
classifier over CCTT14 that achieves a 95% F1-score, to automatically classify
the target dataset under study of this chapter, based on both image and text
content.
• We use a CNN localization technique to double check that our categories and
our trained image model produce an intuitive model.
• For each category, we analyze how quickly and how often it is censored. We
also perform survival analysis per category to investigate how different factors
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interact to affect the lifetime of a post.
• We make CCTI14, CCTT14, our code, and our trained models publicly available to help important efforts such as those to understand image and text
censorship or to identify categories that are likely to be censored.

4.1

Challenges

Here, we describe the challenges that we encountered over the course of analyzing
the target datasets.
The possibility of interactions between multiple factors in post deletion: To decide whether to censor a post, the censors may use any of the factors
recorded in our datasets: images, text, number of reposts, number of comments, or
the user account making the post. Furthermore, censors may also use factors not
recorded in our datasets, such as number of views or information about the political
situation at the time. The last possibility highlights that censorship may change
over time. Furthermore, censorship might even depend upon ideally irreverent factors, such as the motivation of a human monitor on a particular day.
Further complicating matters, the censor may consider multiple factors at a time.
For example, an image of Xi Jinping and text sharing a proverb about the consequences of poor leadership may both be acceptable in isolation but not together.
Also, a borderline image from a sensitive user might be censored very quickly, whereas
the same image from another user might not be censored at all. Such interactions
between factors pose difficulties for finding patterns that increase the likelihood of
censorship.
Indeed, both datasets include apparently sensitive images (e.g., images of protests)
that are not censored and apparently nonsensitive images that are (e.g., images of a
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sunset). There are even some images that appear in both censored and uncensored
posts (e.g., images of a rainstorm). Such results may be produced by any of the
other possible factors playing a role in the decision to censor.
Lack of experimental data: Additionally, having access to observational data
but not experimental data means that any found patterns may be correlated with censorship but not actually causing it. This issue limits our abilities to draw conclusions
about the causes of censorship. While we can find patterns predictive of censorship,
between this limitation and the multiple possible factors discussed above, we cannot
draw firm conclusions about why a post is censored.
Lack of canonical topic categories: Nevertheless, given the nature of censorship, we are confident that the topics of a post’s text and images, if any are
present, has a causal effect on whether a post is censored. Thus, analyzing these
topics are of crucial importance to our study. However, we lack knowledge of how
censors view posts and classify them into topical categories. For example, they may
view all images of protests as simply belonging to a broad protest category, thereby
increasing all of their probabilities of censorship. Alternatively, they may have more
refined categories in mind, drawing a distinction between pro- and anti-government
protests, or even between particular issues being protested.
Lacking a canonical categorization of topics, we must adopt one of our own, which
may lack the distinctions found in the censors’ actual categorization. This lack of
refinement may appear to be noise in our data, that is, seemingly random variations
in how the censor responds to the same topic. However, in actuality, the censor may
be consistently applying a rule more refined than what our analysis can identify.
Clustering methods do not work here: Lacking pre-defined categories, it
may be tempting to automatically categorize the image datasets with clustering
algorithms. However, since the datasets have very diverse images, noisy clustering
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algorithms do not work well. We tried several clustering algorithms (e.g., hierarchical
and K-means), but none of them was able to cluster the images in a way that we
could learn something from the categories. The clustering algorithms would either
come up with: i) too many categories (where many of them have only a few images)
that render the clustering useless, or ii) with a reasonable number of categories each
of which contains many diverse images from which, again, nothing could be learned.

Manual categorization is very time-consuming: The easiest way to get a
clear picture of the data is to manually categorize the posts into some pre-defined
intuitive categories and then study how the censor treats the categories so that we can
learn something from them. However, the target datasets have so many posts (more
than 120,000 overall) that manual categorization would be very time-consuming to
do.

There is no image or text dataset available for studying image and text
censorship: Furthermore, to be able to use ML classification methods to categorize
images and texts, annotated image and text datasets are needed that are particularly
designed for studying censorship in China, but there are no such datasets publicly
available.

To overcome these challenges, we take the very first step in collecting image
and text datasets particularly for studying image and text censorship in Chinese
social media. We refer to these datasets as CCTI14 (Chinese Censorsed Topics
Images) and CCTT14 (Chinese Censorsed Topics Text). Then we train classifiers
over CCTI14 and CCTT14 to help us in categorizing image and text content of posts
in the WeiboScope dataset.
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4.2
4.2.1

Experimental methodology
Image classifier

In this section, we first describe how we assembled the CCTI14 dataset. Then we
present the performance evaluation of our CNN model over CCTI14.

CCTI14 dataset
To find a list of potentially censored categories in Weibo, we relied on previous
research on and censorship events in different domains of censorship in China [57, 29,
19]. We ended up with 14 categories spanning diverse domains including collective
action (e.g., Protest), Chinese politicians (e.g., Xi Jinping, Deng Xiaoping, and
Mao Zedong), crisis and disaster (e.g., rainstorm and fire), political activists (e.g.,
Liu Xiaobo), and mockery (e.g., Winnie the Pooh). We did not include categories
that we were not able to find at least 100 unique images (e.g., Xi Jinping bun) or
were too vague to have them as a separate category (e.g., China anti-corruption).
Our categories are not comprehensive, since there is no such comprehensive list of
categories that China censors. However, we have tried to pick general categories so
that they can be applied for analyzing any other Chinese platforms that practice
censorship.
Training dataset: To assemble a training dataset, we utilized Google Image Search
to find images of 200 × 200 pixels or bigger per category. As has been done by
other studies [18, 17], we scraped Google Images and automatically collected images
per category. In addition to the 14 categories, we carefully crafted an “Other”
class including random images and images that we found could be confused with
other categories (e.g., street banner confused with protest and ocean confused with
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a rainstorm).
As is common practice [51, 18, 17, 15], we then manually removed problematic
images including those that were too blurry or would fall into more than one category
(e.g., an image of both Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong). We also manually removed
all duplicate images in a category or among several categories. To do so, two trained
human annotators verified that images are in the right category, with each annotator
spending 5 hours on average on this. In case of a disagreement between annotators
about an image, an expert made a decision on the image.
We also used the label preserving image augmentation techniques to add more
images to our dataset. Image augmentation is the procedure of taking images and
manipulating them in different ways to create many variations of the same image. In
this way, not only can we train our classifier on a larger dataset, but also we can make
our classifier more robust to image coloring and noise. It has been proven that data
augmentation could be very effective in improving the performance of CNNs [49, 52].
We picked six label-preserving data augmentation techniques: i) contrast normalization, ii) affine transformation, iii) perspective transformation, iv) sharpen, v)
Gaussian blur, vi) padding. We then applied them to each image in our dataset
and added the result images to our dataset. Figure 4.1 shows an example of image
augmentation in CCTI14. Here is how each of these transformations work:

• Contrast normalization changes the contrast in an image by moving pixel
values away or closer to 128. Note that each pixel has a value of 0–255. We
randomly changed the contrast for each image in all RGB channels.
• Affine transformation: It applies an affine transformation to the image. It
rotates and shears the image and fill the areas that appear only in the new
image with a constant color.
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(a)
Original
Image

(b)
Contrast
normalization

(c) Affine
transformation

(d) Perspective
transformation

(e)
Sharpen

(f)
Gaussian
blur

(g)
Padding

Figure 4.1: An example of image augmentation.

• Perspective transformations apply a four-point perspective transformation
to the image which is sort of like advanced cropping.
• Sharpening applies a sharpening kernel over the image and then mixes the
result with the original image.
• Gaussian Blurring uses a Gaussian kernel to blur the image.
• Padding randomly adds padding pixels to top/right/bottom/left of images
and uses a uniform color for all added pixels.
Table 4.1 shows the statistics of our dataset before and after augmentation. We
did not augment the images in the Other category in order to keep the augmented
dataset balanced. This could introduce an artifact into our model where it learns
to recognize augmented images. By evaluating on a test set without augmented
images, we rule out the possibility of this artifact degrading accuracy unacceptably.
Our model trained over this dataset achieved a high F-1 score, as described later in
this section.
Testing dataset: The classifier should be tested against real-world censored images
from Weibo so that it can be trusted in categorizing the WeiboScope dataset which
consists of real censored images. To this end, we assembled a test image dataset
from real-world censored images. We used two human annotators to manually label
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Category

#images before
augmentation

#images after
augmentation

Bo Xilai

151

1055

Deng Xiaoping

217

1299

Fire

232

1392

Injury/Dead body

196

1372

Liu Xiaobo

226

1356

Mao Zedong

215

1289

People’s congress

226

1356

Policeman/Military forces

230

1380

Protest

216

1266

Prurient/Nudity

395

1185

Rainstorm

253

1265

Winnie the Pooh

200

1400

Xi Jinping

622

1238

Zhou Kehua

103

721

1400

1400

5,038

18,966

Other
Total

Table 4.1: CCTI14’s train dataset statistics before and after augmentation.

a small subset of images from the WeiboScope dataset into the 15 categories. Here
are the steps that we followed for assembling the testing dataset:

1. We trained two human raters by providing them the definition for each category
as well as image samples per category.
2. We randomly selected 1000 censored images from WeiboScope dataset.
3. We asked the raters to categorize these images into the 15 categories.
4. If each category has at least 30 images, go to #5. Otherwise go to #2.
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5. In case of a disagreement between raters about an image we asked an expert
to categorize the image.
At the end of this process, we measured the inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s
Kappa coefficient [25]. The inter-rater reliability was 91%, which is satisfactory.
Each rater spent 6 hours on average to annotate the dataset.
The final test dataset has 1014 images (which is equal to about 5% of the size of
the train dataset), and each category has 30-70 images. Note that since the “Other”
category had many more images than other categories, we only kept 70 (randomly
selected) images from that category to balance the dataset.
CCTI14’s training dataset has 5,038 images before augmentation, and 18,966
images after augmentation from 14 categories and one “Other” class in which each
category has 700–1400 images. Also CCTI14’s testing dataset has 1014 images from
real-world censored images from the 15 categories.

CNN model
In this section, we present our CNN model and evaluate its performance using several
metrics. We also explain how we use CNN localization for error analysis.
Classification: We train a CNN classifier using the VGG-16 network [44] over the
CCTI14’s training dataset and then test it with CCTI14’s testing dataset. VGG network is a convolutional neural network architecture developed by the Visual Geometry Group (VGG) from Oxford. VGG has 16 layers and achieves good performance
on object detection tasks [44].
For the training phase, we split the CCTI14’s training dataset, in a stratified
fashion, into primary training set (95% of the data) and development/validation set
(5% of the data). The trained classifier achieves 97% F1-score on the testing dataset.

22

Chapter 4. Multi-modal Classification of Hot Categories

Figure 4.2 shows the confusion matrix for our classifier. As we can see most of the
confusion happens in the “Other” class, as expected.
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Figure 4.2: Confusion matrix of image classifier.

To reduce the incidence of classifying images that belong to none of our categories
as belonging to the most similar category, we used two approaches at the same time:
i) Using an “Other” class: as described in the previous section, ii) Using a confidence
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level threshold: a confidence level threshold of 80% is used to decide whether to accept
the classifier’s decision or not, meaning that if the classifier is 80% or more confident
about its decision on an image we accept it, otherwise we categorize it as belonging to
the “Other” class. We empirically tuned the confidence level threshold and achieved
the best results with 80%.
We have evaluated the performance of the classifier using several metrics: precision, recall and F1-score. These metrics are defined as follows:
Precision =
Recall =

TP
TP + FP

(4.1)

TP
TP + FN

F1-score = 2 ×

(4.2)

Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall

(4.3)

where TP is true positive, FP is false positive, and FN is false negative. The F1score takes into account both precision and recall, making it a more reliable metric
for evaluating a classifier.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the performance evaluation of our classifier
per category. The classifier achieves a precision of 97%, recall of 96% and F1-score
of 97% overall.

Performing CNN localization
To gain further insight into what censors look into to decide to censor a post based
on an image, and also to double check our model as well as the ICC14 categories,
we utilized a CNN localization technique introduced by Zhou et al. [54]. Using the
CNN localization technique, we were able to highlight parts of the images that are
considered the most important parts by the CNN to decide to classify an image as a
specific category.
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Categories

Precision

Recall

F1-score

Bo Xilai

1.00

0.97

0.98

Deng Xiaoping

1.00

1.00

1.00

Fire

0.98

0.94

0.96

Injury/Dead body

1.00

0.97

0.98

Liu Xiaobo

1.00

1.00

1.00

Mao Zedong

1.00

0.97

0.98

People’s congress

1.00

0.97

0.98

Policeman/Military forces

1.00

0.92

0.96

Protest

0.96

0.96

0.96

Prurient/Nudity

1.00

0.94

0.97

Rainstorm

0.96

0.98

0.97

Winnie the Pooh

0.97

1.00

0.98

Xi Jinping

1.00

0.94

0.97

Zhou Kehua

1.00

1.00

1.00

Other

0.71

0.94

0.81

Avg/total

0.97

0.96

0.97

Table 4.2: Performance of our classifier for each category.

We repeatedly used this technique for error analysis and to adjust our model as
well as the CCTI14 categories. For example, by highlighting images, we realized
that our model was classifying images of Xi Jinping by only looking at his forehead.
Although it had a good accuracy in classifying Xi Jinping images, it was suffering
from a high false positive rate (23%), for which the reason was obvious. At that time,
this category in CCTI14 had only images from Xi Jinping’s face with no background
whatsoever. Therefore, we used the following methodology to mitigate this issue:

1. We made an observation such as Xi Jinping is being only classified by his
forehead.
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2. We added more diverse images to that category in the CCTI14 dataset to
address the problem identified in (1).
3. If the false positive rate decreased, then we kept the diverse images.
4. Else, go to (1).

Following this type of methodology generally for all categories helped us increase the
robustness of the trained classifier.
Figure 5.1 shows some instances of highlighted images for each category. In this
and other figures, faces are sometimes blurred to preserve privacy (but will not be
blurred in the released dataset). Here, we summarize the highlighted parts of images
in a category:
• Protest: Only the protest banners and crowd are highlighted.
• Policeman/Military forces: Only parts of the image with policeman’s
uniform and badge are highlighted.
• Injury/Dead: Only parts of the images that present an injury, blood, or a
dead body are highlighted.
• Rainstorm: Only parts of the image with water and its intersection with
objects are highlighted.
• Fire: Only parts of the image with fire and smoke are highlighted.
• People’s Congress: Only parts of the image with congress’s building and
congress’s sign are highlighted.
• Winnie the Pooh: Only parts of the image with Winnie the Pooh’s body
are highlighted.
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• Prurient/Nudity: The obvious parts are highlighted that we do not present
here, because they match our intuitions.
• Individuals: Only parts of the image with the individual’s face are highlighted.

Highlighted examples in Figure 5.1 confirm that our model is trained to look for
the right objects in each category. However, some similar objects still can confuse
the classifier, which we discuss below.
Figure 4.4 shows some examples of the false positives in our model. Images
containing something similar to the main features of each category have been incorrectly categorized as that category. Here we summarize the highlighted parts of false
positives in each category:

• Protest: People in a stadium holding a banner.
• Policeman/Military forces: People wearing a uniform with some sort of
badge.
• Injury/Dead: White pants with red spots, reddish shapes, and fried chicken.
• Rainstorm: People swimming or walking on a beach.
• Fire: Dark clouds or a projector.
• People’s Congress: A wide building with multiple pillars.
• Winnie the Pooh: Yellow cartoon characters.
• Prurient/Nudity: Partial nudity or shapes similar to specific body parts.
• Individuals: People similar to an individual’s face.
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(a) Protest

(b) Policeman/Military

(c) Injury/Dead body

(d) Rainstorm

(e) Fire

(f) People’s Congress

(g) Deng Xiaoping

(h) Winnie the Pooh

Figure 4.3: Examples of highlighted images.

However, before we do any analysis on the images we manually remove false positives from the 14 categories. Since removing false positives from image categories is
fairly easy and it is not very time-consuming, we opt to do so to make our categorized
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data even more clean.

4.2.2

Text classifier

To be able to categorize text content of posts into our 14 categories, we built a text
classifier. To train our classifier we assembled our own text dataset from real-world
Weibo posts that we refer to as CCTT14. Below we explain how we assembled
CCTT14 and then we describe the performance of our text classifier.

CCTT14 dataset
We assembled a text dataset from real-world Weibo posts from the same 14 categories
as CCTT14 as well as an “Other” category, that we refer to as CCTT14. Here are
the steps we took to assemble this dataset:
1. We first trained two human annotators that were native Chinese speakers by
providing them the definition of each category as well as examples of each
category.
2. We then partitioned all posts in the WeiboScope dataset using keywords related
to each category. We used the keywords extracted by Knockel et al. [30] from
four Chinese applications as well as the keywords provided by other online
resources. The goal of this step was to make the manual annotation process
more efficient and less time consuming.
3. We randomly selected 1000 posts from the output of the previous step.
4. We asked the two trained annotators to annotate the selected 1000 posts.
5. We only kept posts that both annotators agreed on their category and if each
category had at least 50 posts, we stopped. Otherwise, go to (3).
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The final dataset has 994 labelled posts in which each category has 50-90 posts.
Each annotator spent about 12 hours on the whole process, and the inter-reliability
of raters was 76%, which was satisfactory.

Classifier performance
We tried different text classifiers (e.g., naive bayes, random forest, neural networks)
over CCTT14 and achieved the highest F1-score with multinomial logistic regression.
We leveraged unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams as the feature vectors. We also used
the Stanford CoreNLP tool [35] for word segmentation and tokenization. The classifier achieves a precision of 96%, recall of 94%, and F1-score of 95% overall when we
tested our classifier using 10-fold cross validation. Figure 4.5 presents the confusion
matrix of our classifier.
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(a) Protest

(b) Policeman/Military

(c) Injury/Dead Body

(d) Rainstorm

(e) Fire

(f) People’s Congress

(g) Deng Xiaoping

(h) Winnie the Pooh

Figure 4.4: Examples of false positives.
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Confusion matrix
Bo Xilai 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Deng Xiaoping 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Fire 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Injury/Dead 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Liu Xiaobo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mao Zedong 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
People’s congress 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Xi Jinping 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Policeman/Military forces 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Protest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Prurient/Nudity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
Rainstorm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01
Winnie the Pooh 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Zhou Kehua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.04

Po
lic
em

Figure 4.5: Confusion matrix of the text classifier.
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4.3

Analysis and results

In this section, we present our results on the WeiboScope dataset. We used our
classifiers to categorize censored and uncensored posts into our 14 categories and then
performed our analysis on the result. 11,269 censored posts and 7,987 uncensored
posts were categorized into the 14 categories. The rest of the posts were categorized
in the “Others” category.

4.3.1

Censorship rate

To discover how often a category is censored and what percent of posts in each
category is censored, we compared the number of posts found in that category within
the censored posts with that of those within the uncensored posts. Table 4.3 shows
the number of posts found in each category as well as the percentage of posts in each
category that was censored. A post ends up in a category if it has either an image
or text in the category.
As one can see in this table, most categories (e.g., protest) are often censored,
whereas some categories (e.g., rainstorm) are less frequently censored. This confirms that the consistency of censorship varies by topic/category. For example, more
sensitive categories may experience a higher deletion rate.

4.3.2

Lifetime

To reveal how quickly posts in a category are censored, we plotted the lifetime
distribution of censored posts in that category in minutes. Lifetime is measured
as the difference between the time an image is posted and the time it is deleted.
Figure 4.6 presents the lifetime distribution per category. As one can see, the median
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Category
Bo Xilai
Deng Xiaoping
Fire
Injury/Dead Body
Liu Xiaobo
Mao Zedong
People’s Congress
Policeman
Protest
Prurient/Nudity
Rainstorm
Winnie the Pooh
Xi Jinping
Zhou Kehua

#Censored posts
665
281
431
1799
184
1093
145
1311
536
2664
153
160
1745
102

#Uncensored posts
336
125
530
1029
123
486
113
927
220
2551
207
177
1029
134

Censorship Rate
64%
70%
45%
51%
60%
70%
56%
59%
71%
51%
43%
48%
63%
43%

Table 4.3: Percentage of censored posts per category.

lifetime for all categories is less than 180 minutes, meaning that most of the posts
are censored in less than three hours.

4.3.3

Survival analysis

Survival analysis is used for analyzing data where the outcome variable is the time
until an event of interest happens. For example, if the event of interest is death,
then the survival time is the time in years, weeks or minutes, etc., until a person
dies. In our case, the event of interest is being censored, and the survival time for a
post is the time until it is censored. In addition, in survival analysis there are two
types of observations: i) those that the event of interest happens during the time of
observation (censored posts in our case), ii) those that the event of interest does not
happen during the time of observation (uncensored posts in our case). That enables
us to take into account both censored and uncensored posts, in contrast with other
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Zhou Kehua
Xi Jinping
Winnie the Pooh
Rainstorm
Prurient/Nudity
Protest
Policeman/Military forces
People's congress
Mao Zedong
Liu Xiaobo
Injury/Dead
Fire
Deng Xiaoping
Bo Xilai
0

200

400

600

Time (minutes)

800

1000

Figure 4.6: Categories vs. life time.

researchers that have only considered the censored posts [57].
To analyze how different factors interact to affect censorship, we performed a
survival analysis per category over the following measured factors: i) whether the
image matches this category, ii) whether the text matches this category, iii) number of
reposts, iv) number of comments, and v) text sentiment. To compute the sentiment
score we utilized the Stanford CoreNLP tool [35] that supports Chinese.
Table 4.4 shows the results of survival analysis per category. Coefficients in
survival analysis relate to hazard (risk of dying or risk of being censored in our case).
A positive coefficient for Image, Text, #Repost, and #Comment, and sentiment
variables means more risk of getting censored and thus shorter lifetime. For example,
almost all of the “Image” variables have a positive coefficient which means having an
image that matches that category increases the risk of being censored and therefore
shorter lifetime. Sentiment is a score between 0-4 (0 being very positive and 4
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Image

Category

Coef.

Text

#Comment

#Sentiment

P

Coef.

P

Coef.

P

Coef.

P

Bo Xilai

0.19 <0.005

0.14

0.41

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.28

0.20

0.04

Deng Xiaoping

0.62

0.01

0.04

0.87

0.00

0.41

0.00

0.52

0.23 <0.005

Fire

0.73 <0.005

0.13

0.59

0.00

0.01

0.00 <0.005

0.11

Injury/Dead
Body

0.63

0.02

-0.02

0.94

0.00

0.12

0.00

0.54

0.24 <0.005

Liu Xiaobo

0.25

0.19

-0.07

0.12

0.00

0.13

0.00

0.24

0.27

0.04

Mao Zedong

0.31

0.09

0.05

0.85

0.00

0.40

0.00

0.04

0.28

0.01

People’s
Congress

0.16

0.07

-0.21

0.18

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.34

0.47 <0.005

Policeman

0.19

0.24

0.09

0.62

0.00

<0.005

0.00

0.36

0.15

0.05

Protest

0.78 <0.005

-0.25

0.28

0.00

0.27

0.00

0.29

0.06

0.05

Prurient

0.74 <0.005

0.09

0.68

0.00 <0.005

0.00

0.19

0.20 <0.005

Rainstorm
Winnie
Pooh

the

P Coef.

#Repost

0.02

-0.50

0.48

-0.87

0.25

0.00

0.19

0.00

0.01

0.31

0.02

0.44

0.09

-0.16

0.14

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.16

0.35 <0.005

Xi Jinping

0.49 <0.005

-0.51 <0.005

0.00

0.74

0.00

0.07

0.09

Zhou Kehua

0.22 <0.005

-0.08

0.00

0.04

0.00

0.23

0.17 <0.005

0.11

0.01

Table 4.4: Survival regression per category.

being very negative). A positive coefficient for sentiment means as we increase the
sentiment score (i.e. being more positive), it decreases the risk of being censored
and therefore longer lifetime.
As shown in Table 4.4, sentiment always has a negative sign and it is always
statistically significant at 5%. That suggests that sentiment is the strongest
indicator of censorship across all categories. Our finding matches with recently
leaked logs from Weibo that they were asked by the government to remove all posts
about an specific incident, but Weibo advised its censorship department to only deal
with the negative content [37].
It is also interesting that image category almost always has a positive sign which
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suggests that having an image that matches that category increases the risk of censorship, but sometimes it is not statistically significant and thus we can not draw
firm conclusions about the image category.

4.4

Conclusions

In this chapter, we analyzed a dataset of censored and uncensored posts from Weibo
using deep learning, NLP techniques, and manual effort. We first introduced the
CCTI14 and CCTT14 datasets with 14 categories designed particularly for studying
image and text censorship in China. Then we trained classifiers on CCTI14 and
CCTT14 and used the classifiers to classify the target dataset so that we can analyze
censorship mechanisms in Weibo.
Using our classifiers, we found that sentiment is the only indicator of censorship
that is consistent across the variety of topics we identified. Our finding matches
with recently leaked logs from Weibo, as discussed in Section 4.3.3. We also found
that some categories (e.g., protest) are often censored, while some categories (e.g.,
rainstorm) are less frequently censored. Our analysis suggests that all the posts from
our 14 categories are deleted in less than three hours on average, which confirms that
censors can delete sensitive content very quickly.
We believe that CCTI14 and CCTT14 could be essential first steps towards analyzing image and text censorship in different platforms in China. We make CCTIT14
and CCTT14 along with our trained models publicly available so that it can help
efforts to analyze similar tasks in other Chinese platforms. We also hope that the
general approach of using image classification for surveillance and censorship research will be applied in other domains, because images are more transparent than
text, especially when domain-specific languages are involved. For example, the informal use of the Chinese language in Chinese social media is referred to as “Martian
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Language” because it so opaque even to native Chinese speakers, but images are
relatively universal (semantically speaking).

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the NLP4IF 2019 anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback.
This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation
under Grant Nos. #1518878, #1518523, #1801613, and #1518918.

38

Chapter 5

Multi-modal Identity Recognition

In this chapter, we aim (i) to determine to what extent censorship is based on the
person being posted about, and (ii) to determine to what extent censorship is based
on the person posting the post. To answer questions such as Is the correlation between
who posted something and how quickly it gets deleted something that is consistent
across all categories, we need a complete list of categories. Focusing on only posts
about people allows us to make a set of categories that arises from the data and is
not limited to a set of subjective predefined categories.
Previous work in this area has identified various indicators of censorship. A body
of work [19, 57, 28, 29, 39, 37] covering censorship of Chinese social media suggests
that various factors, such as the topic of a post, and the number of reposts affects
whether and when censors delete a post. In the previous chapter, we showed that
the sentiment of the text content is a major indicator of censorship. Miller et al. [37]
looked at the phenomena of posters being targeted by the censors and found that
who was posting something was more important than what they posted. However,
they had a small dataset and hand selected categories. Zhu et al. [57] showed that
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there was a correlation between how many posts a user had had deleted and how
quickly their posts were deleted, but stopped short of comparing this to other factors
and had a limited dataset.
All past work has one or more of the following limitations: (1) ignoring the multimodal nature of social media and focusing on just the text content of posts, (2)
relying on relatively narrow datasets collected over a few months rather than years,
(3) tracking a small number of users, or (4) relying on just domain knowledge and
focusing on some pre-defined set of categories that have the “potential” to be censored
instead of striving to extract categories as they are represented in the dataset.
To overcome these limitations, we focus on posts about people and propose
a multi-modal identity recognition approach to extract all identities present in a
dataset using both the image and text content of posts. Also, we use the WeiboScope dataset [28], a more comprehensive dataset tracking 120,000 users over four
years (2015–2018). Thus the scope of this work is specific to posts with images or
text that reference one or more known public figures.
To detect identities in the image content of posts, we first extract all faces from
all censored and uncensored posts using a state-of-the-art face detection technique,
and then cluster them together using a recently proposed face clustering technique.
Then, we manually label face clusters. To detect identities in the text content, we
leveraged a named identity recognizer to extract all individual names from the text
content. Once we have all the posts labeled based on the identities mentioned in the
image and/or text content of posts, we start analyzing the labeled data.
We categorize the identities found in all posts based on their occupations, such
as politicians, media, and journalists. Then, we analyze these categories to see how
quickly and consistently they are censored. We also perform survival analyses to
investigate how various factors interact to affect censorship across different categories
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as well as within all categories.
We found that a strong predictor of censorship is the identity of the user who
has posted the content across different categories and within all categories. We also
found that the gender and nationality of the person who the post is about to be
predictive of censorship, meaning that if a post is about a male/Chinese individual
it is more likely to be censored than a post about a female/non-Chinese individual.
In addition, we identified the number of reposts as a weak predictor of censorship,
meaning that the number of reposts has to be large enough, e.g., 100k, to have a
noticeable effect on censorship. Otherwise, it has almost no effect on censorship.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to extract categories based on
both image and text content from the censored/uncensored posts without making any
assumptions about the categories present in the data. We hope our general approach
will help other researchers uncover censorship mechanisms on other platforms that
practice censorship.
In summary, this chapter presents the following contributions:

• We propose a multi-modal identity recognition approach for analyzing censored/uncensored posts, which extracts all identities present in the data instead of making assumptions about which categories might be present in the
data.

• For each category of identities, we analyze how quickly and how often it is
censored.

• We perform survival analyses to investigate how different factors interact to
affect censorship.
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5.1

Challenges

Analyzing the WeiboScope dataset to discover censors’ priorities and policies poses
multiple challenges that we present here.
The possibility of interactions between multiple factors: Censors might
consider any factors to decide to censor a post such as image content, text content,
number of reposts, or the poster of the content, etc. Furthermore, censors might
consider several factors at a time. For example, an image of Xi Jinping, and a text
of mockery might be acceptable in isolation, but not together.
Further complicating matters, a post in a specific time period might be censored
because of the current political situation, while the same post might be considered
acceptable a few months later. In addition, a post from an opinion leader might
be censored very quickly, while the same post from another user might not. This
possibility of interactions between different factors makes it very challenging to be
able to discover any patterns that would increase the chance of censorship.
Clustering techniques will not extract all categories: To extract all categories from censored and uncensored categories, one could utilize clustering techniques. We tried various methods (e.g., kmeans, hierarchical clustering), but none of
them was able to cluster the data in a meaningful way that enabled learning from the
data. Clustering methods would produce either a few clusters in which each cluster
includes a wide range of posts or too many small clusters to understand.
Manual categorization is very time consuming: One way to categorize the
posts based on both images and texts is to manually categorize them. However, since
the target dataset that we aim to analyze has more than 120,000 posts, it would be
very time consuming to do so.
We do not know how many categories exist in the posts: We do not have
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any prior knowledge about the number of categories that may exist in the image and
text content of posts. Thus, we need an approach that could automatically extract
the categories from both image and text content.

5.2

Experimental methodology

To overcome the aforementioned challenges, we decided to focus on identities and
automatically extract all identities that are present either in the text content or
the image content of posts. To do so, we take a multi-modal identity recognition
approach to extract all identities present in the image and text content of posts.
We utilize a state-of-the-art face clustering technique to cluster faces together as
well as a named identity recognizer to extract all identities in the text content. We
then categorize identities together based on their occupation and perform extensive
analyses over these categories.
To extract all identities from Weibo posts, we run two separate identity detection
mechanisms to extract all identities from images and texts. The input to our system
is unlabeled Weibo posts, and the output of our system is posts that are labeled
based on the identities that are found in the image and/or text content of posts.
Figure 5.1a presents an overview of our approach. Our approach has two main
components:
• Identity detection in images: It detects identities in the image content of
posts and labels posts accordingly.
• Identity detection in texts: It detects the name of identities that are present
in the text content of posts and labels posts accordingly.
We integrate labels generated by the above-mentioned components and label
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posts based on the identities found in the image and/or text content of posts. Below,
we explain how each of these two components work.

Identity detection in images

Label
ed
posts

led
Labe
posts

Unlabeled
posts

Labeled
posts
Integrating labels

Identity detection in texts
(a) An overview of our identity detection approach.

Unlabeled
posts
Extract
images

F1 , F2 , ..., Fn

Feature
extraction

Labeling
clusters

C1 , C2 , ..., Cm

Face
clustering

E1 , E2 , ..., En

Labeled
posts

Face
detection

Labeling
posts

(b) Identity detection in images.

Unlabeled
posts

Extract
texts

Named entity
recognizer
(c) Identity detection in texts.

Figure 5.1: Identity detection.
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5.2.1

Identity detection in images

To label posts based on the identities present in the image content, we designed
a pipeline that takes unlabeled posts as input and gives labeled posts as output
(Figure 5.1b). In the following we describe each component of this pipeline.

Extract images
To begin with, we extract images from posts. Note that we keep track of which
image belongs to which post. We feed these images to the next stage.

Face detection
We run a standard and state-of-the-art face detection technique, MTCNN [53], on
the images and extract all faces from the images. This technique utilizes a pretrained model that is trained over a big dataset, i.e., WIDER FACE that contains
over 200K faces from various ethnicities, occlusions, poses, etc. Note that we keep
track of which face belongs to which post.
MTCNN is a deep learning based approach for face detection that works in unconstrained environment in which there may exist various poses, illuminations, and
occlusions in the images. This is suitable for our application, since we do not have
any prior knowledge about the illuminations and occlusions in the images and we
can not make any assumptions about these factors in our images.

Face clustering
To cluster faces, we utilized a recently proposed state-of-the-art face clustering technique called approximate rank order by Otto et al. [42]. Approximate rank order
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outperforms other techniques for face clustering at scale.
Feature extraction: As a pre-processing step, we first convert images to gray-scale
and then follow the steps presented in the Light CNN approach [50] to normalize
images to 144 × 144 according to face landmarks. The main idea in this approach for
image preprocessing is to find facial landmarks and then rotate eyes points and then
fix the distance between midpoints of eyes and the midpoint of mouth by a certain
value [50].
In other words, approximate rank order leverages a convolutional neural network
to extract features from face images. It inputs the images to a CNN and then takes
the output of the final average-pooling layer as the face representation. Then it
runs an approximate rank order algorithm on these features to cluster face images
together.

Labeling clusters

Having faces clustered, we then manually label them. We first manually either
remove the false positives within clusters or move them to the right cluster. Then
we utilized Google reverse image search to identify the name of the person in each
cluster and then labeled each cluster with that name.

Labeling posts

Once we have the labels for face images, we then go back and label the posts automatically based on the face labels found in images. In case there are multiple faces
in an image we add all of their names as the label of that post, and if a post does
not have an image or no face is found in the image, we label that post as “None”.
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5.2.2

Identity detection in texts

To label posts based on the identities present in the text content, we utilize Named
Entity Recognizer (NER) in the CoreNLP tool [35] that supports Chinese and extracts personal names from text content. Then, we label posts with the person names
found in that post.

5.2.3

Output examples

Table 5.1 illustrates some examples of the output of our identity detection approach.
Given a post, using our approach we are able to extract identities that are present
in the text and image content.
As we can see, sometimes there are multiple identities in the text and/or image
content of a post. Sometimes the identities found in text and image content agree,
sometimes they do not. Sometimes more identities are found in text content than
the image content, and vice versa. Therefore a post might have several identities
associated with it in the text and/or image content, and thus we consider a post to
be about an individual if that individual appears in the list of identities associated
with that post.

5.3

Analysis and results

In this section, we present our analysis results on WeiboScope dataset labeled by
identities present in text and/or image content of posts.
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Post content

Text

Image

Proposal: Let’s only praise Bo Xilai all day from 3.15 o’clock!

Bo Xilai

Bo Xilai

#Fan Bingbing# starred in the
most crazy dream of the summer
of 2016. The most beautiful thing
in the dream is you.

Fan Bingbing

Fan Bingbing

The White House issued a statement on Tuesday in Washington,
following talks between President
Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Washington...

Obama,
Shinzo Abe

Barak
Obama,
Shinzo Abe

Xi Jinping stared with a rare
sharp look ... his hands even became fists! After the photo was
issued, many netizens have commented: Xi Jinping’s eyes are his
true heart.

Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping,
Jiang Zemin

In the long history of today and
in the future, Mao Zedong and
his thoughts are a mountain that
cannot be bypassed by any political party or faction!...

Mao Zedong

Deng Xiaoping

In Xichuan meeting, Kim Jongun stunned for a long time.

Kim Jong-un

Donald
Trump,
Xi
Jinping, Peng
Liyuan

Text content

Image content

Table 5.1: Output of our identity detection approach.
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5.3.1

Identities and categories

In total, we discovered 263 unique persons in the text and/or image content of
censored and uncensored posts. We removed identities found in the image and text
content that were unrecognized; they were random people with less than 10 posts
mentioning them. For example, in protest images there were unrecognized people in
the background that we were not interested in since they were not the subject of the
image.
Following that procedure, we ended up with 197 identities. Of them, 102 identities
appear in both censored and uncensored posts, 53 identities appear only in the
censored posts, and 42 identities appear only in the uncensored posts. We then
utilized Google search to group identities into categories based on their occupation.
We ended up with 11 categories, ranging from politician to athlete.
Table 5.2 presents the categories along with their statistics in detail. For each
category, it presents the number of posts with someone from that category mentioned
in the image content only, text content only, and either text or image content of the
posts. As we can see, most identities are found in the media and politician categories,
with the most posts from the politician category. In total, we found 5402 censored
posts and 1791 uncensored posts with someone mentioned in the text and/or image
content of the post. Next, we investigate these categories in more depth.

5.3.2

Censorship rate

To understand how consistently each category of identities are censored, we analyzed the censorship rate per category. Table 5.2 shows the result of this analysis.
Some categories such as politician, activist, human rights lawyer, and police officer are almost always censored, while some other categories like media, business-
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man/businesswomen, and athlete are less frequently censored. That indicates that
government-related people are more likely to be censored than others.
Group

Image only

#Identities

#Cens. #Uncens.

Text only
Rate

#Censor. #Uncens.

Rate

#Censor.

#Uncens. Rate

Media

69

49

1035

722

59%

1064

722

60%

Politician/CPC member

51

1319

116

92%

1801

399

82%

3012

483

86%

Businessman/businesswoman

18

25

11

70%

275

184

60%

282

179

61%

Foreign politician

14

20

55

27%

294

197

60%

322

237

58%

Human rights lawyer

13

18

0 100%

186

15

97%

206

15

93%

Military figure

9

35

0

100%

174

24

88%

196

24

89%

Writer/essayist/novelist

8

25

4

86%

107

25

81%

113

29

80%

Professor/scientist

7

14

0

100%

99

18

85%

101

18

85%

Journalist

8

10

0

100%

91

12

88%

95

12

89%

Athlete

8

16

0

100%

44

60

42%

56

60

48%

Activist

2

16

0

100%

43

12

96%

56

12

82%

197

1547

186

89%

4149

1670

71%

5402

1791

75%

Total

0 100%

Text/Image

Table 5.2: Categories of identities along with the number of posts found in censored
and uncensored posts. It also shows the percentage of censored posts per group of
identities.

5.3.3

Gender and nationality

We also investigated the gender and nationality (Chinese vs. non-Chinese) of the
identities present in the text and/or image content of the posts. Table 5.3 presents
statistics for posts based on gender and nationality. As we can see, most of the censored posts are about a male/Chinese individual. Generally speaking, this indicates
that a post talking about a male/Chinese individual is more likely to be censored as
opposed to a post talking about a female/non-Chinese person.

5.3.4

Life time

To discover how fast each category of identities is censored, we analyzed the lifespan
of censored posts. The lifespan of a post is measured as the duration from the time
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Posts

Male

Chinese

Censored

89%

90%

Uncensored

76%

72%

Table 5.3: Distribution of posts based on gender and nationality of the identities
present in the text and image content of posts.

Writer/Essayist/Novelist
Professor/Scientist
Politician/CPC member
Military general/leader/officer

Groups

Media
Journalist
Human rights lawyer
Foreign politician
Businessman/Businesswoman
Athlete
Activist
0

200

400

600

800

Time (minutes)

1000

1200

Figure 5.2: Lifespan based on both images and text.

it is posted until it is censored. Figure 5.2 illustrates this result. As we can see,
the median lifespan of posts in each category is about 3 hours. That indicates that
posts in each category are censored at a consistent pace and censors do not pay more
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attention to any of our specified categories.
We also analyzed the lifespan of posts about individuals. Figure 5.3 presents the
results for individuals with more than 10 posts. As we can see, the median lifespans
for all individuals are between 100–300 minutes.
To further investigate whether there is a significant difference between the lifespan
among individuals we performed statistical tests. First we used a Kruskal-Wallis
test [9], which is a non-parametric one-way analysis of variance to test the lifetime
for equality. This test does not require the assumption of normality, as our data
seems to be skewed. This test is usually used to determine whether there are any
statistically significant differences between several unrelated groups (individuals in
our case). The null hypothesis is that all the lifespans are originating from the
same distribution, and if the null hypothesis is rejected it means that two or more
lifespans are different from the others. We tested this at α = 0.05 significance level.
The p-value was 2.35 ∗ 10−4 , rejecting the null hypothesis.
Then, we used a Tukey HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) test [12] to determine which lifespans are different at a significance level of α = 0.05. We tested
all pairwise differences for significant differences. Among all pairs of individuals, we
found that only the differences in lifespans between Xu Wei and Li Zhi and between
Yuan Guiren and Li Zhi are statistically significant. Finding so little evidence of
censors varying response times by the person about whom a post is, we suspect
that, in general, the Weibo censors do not pay more attention to posts about some
individuals than others.
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Huang Xiaoming
Chen Zongluo
Feng Xiaogang
Zhou Enlai
Jay Chou
Li Chen
Lin Wei
Lu Xun
Xu Caihou
Shen Jilan
Putin
Li Keqiang
Pu Zhiqiang
Guo Boxiong
Yu Chenggang
Hitler
He Weifang
Zhou Xiaoping
Lei Yang case
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Liu Xiang
Liu Hai
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Deng Xiaoping
Viann Zhang
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Obama
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Yang Hua
Lei Jun
Fan Bingbing
Li Xiaolin
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Lei Feng
Zhou Yongkang
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Li Zhi
Chen Youxi
Bo Xilai
Mao Zedong
Yuan Guiren
Zhou Qiang
Ma Yun
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Wang Mingchuan
Chiang Kai-shek
Sakyamuni
Wang Yu
Xiao Gang
Xie Yang
Trump
Kim Jong-un
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Chai Jing
Wang Qishan
Xu Wei
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Figure 5.3: Lifespan of posts about an individual.
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5.3.5

Survival analysis

Survival analysis is generally used to analyze data where the outcome variable is
the time until an event of interest occurs, such as death, heart attack, or marriage.
Subjects are monitored for a specific period of time and the time to the event of
interest is recorded, which is called the survival time.
In our case, the event of interest is censorship and the time to the event of interest
is the time until the post is censored, which we measure in minutes.
One of the most popular regression techniques for survival analysis is the Cox
proportional hazards regression. The purpose of this model is to simultaneously
explore the relationship between the survival time and several risk factors. In a Cox
model, the measure of effect is the hazard ratio, which is the risk of failure (i.e.
risk of being censored in our case). This risk is measured as the proportion of posts
censored during a time period normalized by the time period’s length:
c(t, t + δ)/n(t)
δ

(5.1)

where c(t, t + δ) is the number of censored posts between time t and t + δ and n(t) is
the number of posts available for censorship at time t. The length of the period time
δ can be taken to the limit 0 to calculate the instantaneous rate. The Cox regression
model is defined as follows:
h(t) = h0 (t) exp(b1 X1 + b2 X2 + · · · + bn Xn )

(5.2)

where h(t) is the expected hazard at time t, h0 (t) is the baseline hazard and represents
the hazard when all independent variables, X1 , X2 , . . . , Xn are equal to zero.
To investigate how different factors interact to affect censorship, we performed
several survival analyses using the Cox model, over each category and over all categories. We discuss these analyses below.
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Category

Image
Coef.

Text
P Coef.

#Repost
P

Coef.

P

#Comment
Coef.

P

Sentiment

User sensitivity

Coef.

P

Coef.

P

Media

0.85 <0.005

-0.15

0.76

0.00

0.02

-0.00

0.36

-0.13

0.19

1.08

<0.005

Military figure

0.20

0.49

0.73

0.06

0.00 0.92

-0.00

0.67

-0.16

0.05

0.39

0.01

Foreign politician

-0.14

0.51

1.00

0.03

0.00

0.16

0.00

0.73

-0.32

0.06

0.70

<0.005

Politician

0.08

0.23

-0.37

<0.005

0.00

0.21

0.00

0.05

0.11

0.07

0.49

<0.005

-0.24

0.37

6.04

0.48

0.00

0.23

0.00

0.78

-0.02

0.22

0.94

<0.005

Journalist

1.01

0.10

0.30

0.58

0.00

0.12

0.00

0.62

0.85

0.06

0.46

0.04

Human rights
lawyer

0.45

0.13

0.78

0.14

0.00

0.25

0.00

0.51

0.34

0.26

0.24

0.06

Businessman

Writer

0.31

0.17

0.11

0.47

0.00

0.16

0.00

0.43

0.47

0.15

0.61

<0.005

Professor

0.06

0.05

0.25

0.28

0.00

0.37

0.00

0.29

1.26

<0.005

0.59

0.01

Activist

0.23

0.12

0.34

0.06

0.00

0.48

0.00

0.19

-0.21

0.64

0.70

0.05

Athlete

0.49

0.15

0.04

0.08

0.00

0.10

0.00

0.27

-0.37

0.50

2.14

<0.005

Table 5.4: Survival regression per category.

Survival analysis per category

We utilize survival analysis to investigate how different factors interact to affect
censorship. We first perform a survival analysis per category and consider six factors
that previous work considered to be indicators of censorship: (1) whether the image
content matches this category, (2) whether the text content matches this category,
(3) number of reposts, (4) number of comments, (5) sentiment score of the text
content, and (6) user who has posted the content. Sentiment is a score between 0–4
in which 0 means very negative and 4 means very positive.
We can not consider the user who has posted the content directly in the survival
analysis. Generally speaking, to be able to interpret the coefficient of a variable in
a regression model, we should be able to interpret one unit increase/decrease of the
variable, that is, addition has to be meaningful for the variable. For example, a unit
increase/decrease of number of reposts could be interpreted as more/less reposts. On
the other hand, despite being numbers, user IDs do not have a meaningful notion
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of addition since one unit increase/decrease of user ID is not interpretable. Thus,
we cannot directly use the user ID as a regression variable. To solve this issue, we
followed two separate approaches:
• “user sensitive” variable: Introducing a new binary variable for each user indicating whether the user is sensitive or not. We call a user sensitive if more
than half of their posts are censored.
• “user sensitivity” variable: Introducing a new variable that measures how prone
the user is to be censored. We compute it as the percentage of a user’s posts
that is censored.
To compute these variables for the poster of a post, we consider only the posts
before the one currently considered in the survival analysis. We achieved similar
results with both approaches, therefore we choose to present only the results for the
second approach.
Table 5.4 shows the result of this survival analysis. For each variable, a larger
positive coefficient means more risk of being censored and thus shorter lifetime.
As we can see, user sensitivity is the strongest indicator of censorship
across all categories. This is always statistically significant at 5%. There are
at least two possible reasons for user sensitivity being such a strong indicator of
censorship. The first is that users who have posted banned material in the past may
be more likely to do so in future.
The second possibility is that censors may become familiar with who posts banned
material and keep a closer eye on them. This possibility would be in line with recently
leaked logs from Weibo in which they were asked by the government authorities to
report the “big users” to the government and also asked about influential users [37].
Table 5.5 shows some of these leaked logs from Weibo. As we can see, they were
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asked to report big users to authorities in the first two logs and they were also asked
whether there are any influential users in the third log. We leave determining which
of these two possibilities are in play to future work.

Incident

Leaked log

Yang
Lan’s
Citizenship

“’Yang Lan is a US citizen’ should be considered fake news,
if it is seen on Weibo, delete it, report big users”1

Trial of
Zhiyong

Xu “On May 23rd, Xu Zhiyong used domestic sites (Sina Weibo
and Tencent Weibo) and foreign sites (Twitter) to incite Netizens to join Gongmeng, to purchase a “citizen” badge. Even
calling for people to sign a “citizen promise” [...] If this content is seen on Weibo, secret it. Report big users to the
authorities.”2

Bo
Xilai’s “Handling Bo Xilai-related posts: Total posts censored,
Scandal
among them, support for Bo (#, %), ridicule [of Bo] (#, %),
reposting foreign media (#, %), other (#, %). [Also report]
whether or not there are any influential users clearly and directly supporting Bo. Also, today’s Bo Xilai reporting should
be calculated according to the following intervals. The reporting up schedule has been revised to the following three time
slots: 10am, 6pm, and 11pm.”3
Table 5.5: Leaked logs from Weibo, from [37].

Chinese: 传杨澜为美国籍为虚假消息微博见到删除重点用户报一下.
Chinese: “许志永”于5月23日在境内《新浪微博》、《腾讯微博》及境外
《推特》发布信息煽动网民加入“公盟”组织,购买“公民”徽章。并呼吁网民签署《公民承
诺》。原文称:“需要公民徽章的请给我发信,我们需要再订制。其实不需要传统意义上的
所谓加入,公民(公盟)是自由公民的联合,我们都是时代新公民,为公民社会共同努力!请发信
至,常联系。这个内容微博中见到私密,重要用户发的上报负责人”
3 Original Chinese:
“有关薄的处理数XX条, 其中, 支持薄XX条, 占XX%, 调侃XX条,
占XX%,转发外媒XX条,占XX%,其他情况XX条,占XX%。有无影响力大的用户明显直接挺
薄内容。今天薄熙来的数同时按这个时段统计这个报数时间段改为10点、18点、23点三时
段”
1 Original

2 Original
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Survival analysis over all categories

To further analyze the data, we performed a survival analysis over all categories.
We included the same variables from the previous section, and added one separate
variable per each category showing whether the post belongs to that category. In
addition, we added two more variables, gender and nationality, into the survival
analysis. That gives us 19 different variables.
Figure 5.4 presents the result of this survival analysis. The x-axis is the coefficient
and y-axis represents the variables. In this figure “*” and “**” indicates significance
at the 95%, and 99% level respectively. User sensitivity remains the strongest
indicator of censorship. Gender, nationality, and number of reposts are
also observed as other indicators of censorship. None of our categories show
significant association with censorship. This suggests that the attributes of a post is
more indicative of censorship than the category of posts, based on the categories we
identified.
However, this analysis may potentially be biased toward censored posts since we
downsampled the uncensored posts, therefore we did an additional experiment. In
this experiment, we only considered censored posts and redefined user sensitivity as
the number of times the user is censored in the past. In this way, we eliminate the
potential bias in the previous analysis. Figure 5.5 shows the results of this survival
analysis over censored posts only. As we can see, the results are similar to the
previous analysis, and user sensitivity remains the strongest indicator for censorship.
Based on Figure 5.4 and 5.5, number of reposts has a very small positive coefficient, as opposed to other censorship indicative variables (i.e., user sensitivity,
gender, and nationality) that have a relatively large positive coefficient. This shows
that number of reposts has a weak correlation with censorship in our survival model.
To further investigate this and see how weak this variable is in regards to censorship,
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Activist
User sensivity**
Journalist
Human rights lawyer
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Nationality**
Military figure
Politician
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Writer
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Figure 5.4: Survival analysis over all categories based on both censored and
uncensored posts.

and how many reposts could make a difference, we performed another analysis that
is presented in below.

Survival model on the number of reposts

To further analyze how the number of reposts could affect censorship, we utilized
the survival model from the previous section to perform another analysis. We keep
everything in the survival analysis fixed and vary the value of the number of reposts
to investigate the effect of number of reposts on the survival function. The survival
function is defined as follows:
S(t) = P (T > t)

(5.3)
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Figure 5.5: Survival analysis over all categories based on censored posts only.

where T is the lifetime for some post, and P is the probability function. Thus
S(t) or survival time indicates how likely it is for some post to survive after time t.
Figure 5.6 presents the result of this analysis. As we can see, the number of reposts
has to be large, for example 100,000, to affect the survival time in a noticeable way.
For example, the likelihood of survival (not being censored) of a post with 1000
reposts after 200 minutes is close to the baseline survival which is about 65%, while
the same likelihood for a post with 100k reposts is about 45%.
In other words, posts that receive a lot of attention in terms of number of reposts
are more likely to be censored than those with a small number of reposts. Our
analysis suggests that the threshold for the number of reposts to start making a
difference in the lifetime is as large as 100k.
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1.0
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Number of reposts=100
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Figure 5.6: Survival function by keeping everything fixed and varying the the
number of reposts. The x-axis shows the survival time/lifetime.

5.3.6

Topical analysis

Next, we extract censored topics per individual to further analyze the censors’ priorities. We leverage the Biterm topic model (aka BTM) [22] which is shown to be more
effective in extracting topics from short text documents or tweets than the conventional topical models such as LDA and PLSA. BTM models the word co-occurrence
in a document (a post in our case) to improve the learning of a topical model. It also
utilize the aggregated patterns in the entire corpus (all posts) to solve the issue of
sparse word co-occurrence patterns at document level. To extract words we utilized
Stanford NLP toolbox, CoreNLP [35] which supports Chinese.
Category

Identity

Hot topics in censored Summary
posts
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Media

Li Yuchun

Li

Yuchun,

Cannes, She did not follow “Chi-

met gala, ins update,

nese white tie” dress code

urnotchrislee ins update,

in Met Gala event [14].

girls band urnotchrislee

“urnotchrislee” is her instagram username.

Media

Fan

Bing-

bing

Fan Bingbing, beauty,

She appeared in Cannes

Ying, Zhang, first, red Film Festival in 2015 with
carpet, Cannes Film Fes-

a 3D floral dress [7].

tival, movies
Politician

Jiang Zemin

The old leader, Hainan

Jiang Zemin and his fam-

Dongshanling,

ily take a mountain hike

East,

the

Hainan

country’s in public appearance in

president, Jiang Zemin’s Dongshan [2].
family,

Deng

Hainan,

family generation, vigorous publicity,

Jiang

Zemin up the mountain
Politician

Journalist

Li Xiaolin

Chai Jing

electricity, bank, former,

She held about $2.5 mil-

business,

lion in a secret HSBC ac-

Switzerland,

money, HSBC

count in Switzerland [4].

Chai Jing,

“Under the dome” is a

under the

dome, Chai Jing dome, documentary by Chai Jing
quiet dome, quiet dome

that criticizes Chinese air
pollution [13].

Military

Guo

figure

iong

Box-

Guo

Boxiong,

Dollar,

A foreign media reported

More than ten, at home,

that Guo Boxiong found

Multiple, Foreign media, nearly 100 million US dolTon, first name, antique
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Writer

Long Ying-

Long Yingtai, life, son, This is a dialogue between

tai

dignity,

right,

words, her and her son in one of

child, select, When you,

her books: “I hope that

hope

you will have the right
to choose in the future.
Choose meaningful, timebased work instead of being forced to make a living...” [5].

Foreign

Puttin

politician

Putin, document, russia, Putin involved in the $2
money laundering,

se-

cret, offshore, suspected,

billion money laundering
scandal [10]

transaction, president
Business-

Wang Jian-

Wang Jianlin, Dawan, Ma Yun and Wanda group

man

lin

China, hour, Family, Air-

chairman, Wang Jianlin,

craft, group, Chairman,

were considered to be

Ma Yun

“fighting” over buying airplanes. [6]

Human

Pu Zhiqiang

the

court

sentenced,

He

was

given

a

sus-

rights

tomorrow morning, the

pended prison sentence af-

lawyer

trial, two days before

ter being convicted be-

the court, the evidence cause of his provocative
was convicted, the crime online criticism of the govof provocation, looking

ernment [1].

for he crime of nuisance,
fifty years old
Table 5.6: Topics in censored posts per identity.
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Table 5.6 shows the results of the topical analysis for some identities per category.
After extracting a topic (which is a list of words), we then looked up those words
online to see if we can find a corresponding event related to those words. The
summary section presents these events.
As we can see in this table, most topics are about government criticism, corruption, ridicule, or even foreign politicians corruption. However, this is interesting that
cultural topics are also targeted for censorship. For example, posts about Li Yuchun
(a singer) not following the dress code are also censored. Or post about Fan Bingbing
(an actress) appearing with a floral dress in Cannes Film Festival are censored as
well.

5.4

Conclusions

In this chapter, we proposed a multi-modal identity recognition approach for studying
post deletion in Chinese social media. We focus on the WeiboScope dataset which
is collected over four years by tracking 120,000 users in Sina Weibo. As opposed to
previous work, we take a multi-modal approach and extract all identities based on
both text and image content of posts in this dataset, and then label posts based on
the identities that are found in their text or/and image content. We then categorize
these identities based on their occupations.
This process provided us with 11 categories, ranging from politician to athlete.
In this way we are able to extract categories that are arising from the dataset, as opposed to previous work that rely on some pre-defined categories. We then performed
extensive statistical analysis, including survival analysis, to investigate to what extent censorship is based on the person being posted about, and to determine to what
extent censorship is based on the person posting the post. We also investigated how
different factors might correlate with censorship.
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We showed that the user who has posted the content is the major indicator of
censorship. This finding is in line with recent leaked logs from Weibo. We also
showed that gender, nationality and the number of reposts are other indicators of
censorship. However, for the number of reposts to show any considerable indication
of censorship, it has to be very large, such as 100,000.
We hope that our approach could help other researchers to uncover censorship
mechanisms in other platforms that practice censorship.
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Predicting Censorship on Weibo
In this chapter, we build a machine learning model to predict censorship on Weibo
with high precision and recall. We explore different models and features to see if
there is any correlation between these features and prediction power.

6.1

Challenges

Predicting censorship on Weibo poses several challenges that we describe here.
Multiple stakeholders with different interests: There is not one single
authority that dictates censorship policies. In fact, there are multiple stakeholders
with different interests, e.g., political, economic, personal, etc. This phenomenon
makes it hard to discover patterns that predict censorship with high precision and
recall.
Censorship policies might change over time: Censorship policies might
change over time, depending on the current political or economical situation. A
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topic that is considered sensitive one time and heavily censored, might be considered
benign some other time and not censored at all, because the political situation has
changed. Specially since our dataset is collected over 4 years, it is very likely that
we have such discrepancies represented in our dataset, meaning that some content
is sometimes censored, while it is left uncensored at some other time. This would
potentially make the accurate censorship prediction harder.
The possibility of using factors not recorded in our dataset: Generally
censors might look at any factors to decide to censor a post. Some of these factors
might not be recorded in our dataset. For example, they might look at the number
of views or the current political situation to make a decision which are not recorded
in our dataset. Furthermore, censors might introduce human error into the dataset.
Having said that, predicting censorship based on only the factors recorded in our
dataset might make the prediction harder.

6.2

Feature extraction

We did not include any user related features, e.g., user sensitivity, because that might
bias our study since we have downsampled the uncensored posts. Any user that has
a censored post and anything less than all of their uncensored posts following the
censored one sampled will lead to some degree of bias. Suppose that a user has 10
censored posts and 2000 that are uncensored in the raw data before downsampling,
and suppose also that their first post is censored. In expectation, 3 uncensored posts
will make it into the dataset compared to all 10 censored posts. A naive classifier
could just label all posts as censored to get 10 right and 3 wrong for 10/13 = 77%
accuracy. However, the accuracy on the whole dataset would be 10/2010 = 0.5%.
Thus, we did not include such features in the analysis in this Chapter. We categorize
the features that we extract and study into two different groups:
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1. N-grams: We use all unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams that appear at least 10
times in the entire dataset as feature vectors. Then we utilize the TF-IDF (term
frequency–inverse document frequency) approach to extract the feature values.
TF-IDF is widely used in text classification tasks and we briefly describe it
below.
TF-IDF is a statistic method that is intended to capture how important a word
is to a document (or a post in our case) in a collection of documents. TF-IDF is
a product of term frequency and inverse document frequency. Term frequency,
tf (t, d), is the number of times that term t appears in document d. On the other
hand, inverse document frequency measures how much information the word
provides by measuring how common or rare the word is across all documents.
It is defines as follows:
idf (t, D) = log(N/|d ∈ D : t ∈ d|)

(6.1)

where N is the total number of documents in corpus, and |d ∈ D : t ∈ d| is the
number of documents that include term t.
2. Other features: It includes other features:
(a) Sentiment score: Sentiment is a score between 0-4 (0 being very negative
and 4 being very positive)
(b) Reposts: We convert the number of reposts into a binary feature based
on a threshold of 20k, meaning that if #repost is greater than 20k this
feature is set to 1, otherwise it will set to 0. We follow this approach
based on what we learned in the previous chapter that the number of
reposts has to be large enough to make a noticeable change in the lifetime
of a post. We chose 20K because based on Figure 5.6 the point for the
number of reposts to start to make a difference is 20K. Furthermore,
through empirical analysis we show that this approach works better that
just using the raw data.
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(c) Comments: Similar to #reposts.
(d) Word count: It captures the length of the text content based on the
number of words it contains.
(e) Has URL: It captures whether the text content includes a URL.
(f) Has hashtag: It captures whether the text content includes a hashtag.
(g) Has mention: It captures whether the text content includes a mention.

Following the feature extraction process described above gives us 35,236 features
in total. Of them, 35,228 are n-grams features that are TF-IDF weighting of unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams. Next we build a classifier based on these features.

6.3

Dataset

We utilize the reduced WeiboScope dataset described in Section 3.1 for this section.
We randomly split the dataset into a training part (80%) and a testing part (20%).

6.4

Training a classifier

Since we have 35,236 features, we speculate that many of these features will not help
the classifier and might even confuse the classifier and lower the accuracy. Therefore,
we leverage the chi-square test for dimensionality reduction to extract the K most
important features to the classifier. The chi-square test computes chi-squared stats
between each non-negative feature and class. Thus it removes features that are
most likely independent of the class and irrelevant for classification. To discover the
optimal value for K we perform a linear search approach to discover which K value
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Figure 6.1: Tuning the number of best features.

gives us the highest accuracy. This linear search does not depend on the order of the
features, because we only consider the best K features out of all features.

We explore this using 3 different classifiers: Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression,
and Random Forest. We mapped censored and uncensored class labels to one and
zero respectively. Figure 6.1 shows the result of tuning K. The x-axis shows the
values of K which is the number of best features, and the y-axis shows the accuracy
of the classifier. As we can see, Logistic Regression outperforms the other classifiers
and achieves the highest accuracy of 76.29% when we used the best 9 features. We
use this model trained over best 9K features for the rest of this chapter.
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6.5

Feature importance

Logistic Regression enables us to investigate which features are the most important
ones for the classification. The weights of variables can be used to obtain the feature
importance. A large positive coefficient of a variable signifies higher importance of
that variable in the prediction of censored posts. The higher the value the more
important the feature.
Figure 6.2 shows the top 20 important features for the Logistic Regression classifier that we trained in the previous section. Here we summarize the results from
this figure:

• The most important feature among all features is the sentiment score of the
text. It also confirms our finding that sentiment is an indicator of censorship
and negative content is more likely to be censored.
• Number of reposts is also seen as an important feature to the classifier which
confirms our finding from the previous chapter.
• Among the N-grams features, N-grams such as “Bo Xilai”, “Chinese Communist Party”, “Tiananmen”, “Corruption”, “Mao Zedong”, and “Public opinion”
are the most important features. Most of these N-grams are politician names
or politics related. “Cannes” N-gram could be related to the Cannes Film
Festival incident that was among the censored topics reported in Table 5.6.
• Although we removed user sensitivity measures from the analysis in this Chapter because of the potential bias created by downsampling, the downsampling
could affect other features by proxy. For example, if a user always signed their
posts then this N-gram would become a proxy for their user ID an reintroduce
the potential problems with downsampling. However, the top N-grams in our
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Figure 6.2: Feature importance (The higher the score, the more important the
feature is).
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feature set do not show any evidence that this is a significant factor.

Features

Classifier

Accuracy

Precision/Recall F-1 score

All N-grams LR

66.88

67.80/69.66

68.72

All N-grams RF

65.14

67.13/65.13

66.11

All N-grams NB

66.62

69.16/64.04

66.71

Others

LR

55.18

54.73/81.82

65.59

Others

RF

55.59

56.99/60.95

58.90

Others

NB

54.31

53.93/85.71

66.21

All features

LR

72.87

70.48/85.12

77.51

All features

RF

72.21

71.94/83.47

75.27

All features

NB

66.21

68.02/70.91

79.30

Best 9K

LR

76.29

74.81/81.01

78.80

Best 9K

RF

75.07

73.81/79.21

76.09

Best 9K

NB

70.42

66.35/72.89

68.29

Table 6.1: Censorship prediction evaluation using different sets of features. LR
stands for Logistic Regression, RF stands for Random Forest, and NB stands for
Naive Bayes.

To further investigate on these features and see which set of features has the
strongest predictive power, we trained different classifiers over different sets of features. Table 6.1 summarizes the performance evaluation of these classifiers. Here we
summarize the results of this table:

• The Logistic Regression model trained over the best 9K features achieves the
highest accuracy of 76.29%. Using all features lowers the accuracy by about
4%.
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• N-grams have more predictive power than the other features, and less predictive
power than the best 9K features.

6.6

Conclusions

In this chapter, we built a binary classifier to predict censorship on Sina Weibo.
We achieved the highest accuracy of 76.29% using a logistic regression classifier
trained over the best 9K features. Considering that we do not have access to all
of the information that goes into a censorship decision, such as directives, this is a
relatively good accuracy and is acceptable for analyzing features. Then we analyzed
the features that are the most important ones for classification. We showed that the
most powerful variable in prediction is the sentiment of the text content. This is
consistent with our finding in the fourth chapter that negative content is more likely
to be censored than positive content We also showed that the number of reposts
has some predictive power. Then we analyzed the most important N-grams for the
classifier and showed that most of them are either politician names, e.g., “Bo Xilai”,
or related to government, e.g., “Corruption”.

Acknowledgments
This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation
under Grant Nos. #1518878, #1518523, #1801613, and #1518918.

74

Chapter 7

Conclusion and Future Work
The work in this dissertation takes a departure from previous work in analyzing
censorship in Chinese social media by two main aspects: 1) It takes a multi-modal
approach that takes into account both text and image content, 2) It focuses on a large
dataset, WeiboScope, that is collected over 4 years by tracking more than 120,000
users. All past work focuses only on text content and ignores the image content
altogether, and focuses on narrow datasets collected in a short period of time. These
studies are biased toward whatever was trending or popular in the specific period of
time that the data is collected. Thus their results are limited. In this work, we use
a dataset collected over 4 years and we take the image content into account as well.
This work analyzes over 128,000 censored and uncensored posts from Sina Weibo
collected from 2015-2018.
Analyzing post deletion from a machine learning perspective needs datasets to
train classifiers on, but there was no such dataset available. Thus we took the first
step to collect an image and a text dataset, i.e. CCTT14 and CCTI14, labeled by 14
topics that have the potential to be censored on Chinese social media. Using these
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datasets we were able to build classifiers with high accuracy to categorize the WeiboScope dataset (which consists of more than 128K censored and uncensored posts).
Analyzing the categorized censored and uncensored posts revealed that sentiment
plays a major role in censorship, meaning that negative content are more likely to
be censored. This finding was in line with recent leaked logs from Weibo in which
they were instructed to only deal with negative content.
One major limitation of the above-mentioned work was that we heavily relied
on domain knowledge and only focused on 14 topics that have the potential to be
censored, while these topics might not be a comprehensive representative of the
data. Furthermore, another researcher might come up with a completely different
set of topics based on their domain knowledge. Thus to overcome this challenge
we focused on posts that talk about people, because it enables us to extract all
identities from both text and image content of posts with the help of recent advances
in face clustering and named identity recognition. Then we categorized the identities
based on their occupation. In this way, we extracted categories that arise from
the dataset, as opposed to our early work that relied on domain knowledge. More
importantly, another researcher can easily reproduce our work and would extract
the same categories. Using this approach we could answer questions like (i) to what
extent censorship is based on the person being posted about, and (ii) to what extent
censorship is based on the person posting the post.
Analyzing the categorized data via extensive statistical analysis, e.g., survival
analysis, showed that the user who has posted the content is the major
indicator of censorship. This result is also in line with leaked logs from Weibo in
which they were instructed to report up “big” and “influential” users.
Finally, we built a classifier to predict censorship over the WeiboScope dataset.
Our classifier is enable to achieve 76.29% accuracy when we used the best 9K features
to trained a Logistic Regression model.
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7.1

Limitations

Our work in this dissertation has some limitations that are summarized below:

• WeiboScope dataset: Some of our limitations are related to the data that
was/was not collected by WeiboScope. These include:
– Our results are bound to factors that were available to us: We
only considered factors that were available to us through the WeiboScope
dataset. WeiboScope does not collect other factors that might be correlated with censorship such as #followers, whether the user is verified, etc.
However, WeiboScope was the most comprehensive dataset that was available to us at the time of writing this dissertation. Thus our results are
limited to the factors that were available to us and we tested them.
– We might have missed some censored posts: The WeiboScope
dataset checks for post deletion every 20 minutes, while based on Zhu et
al. [57] 30% of total post deletions occur within 5-30 minutes. Therefore,
WeiboScope might have missed some censored posts and as a consequence
we have not included such posts in our analysis throughout this dissertation. Thus our results might be biased toward posts that live longer than
20 minutes.
– Number of reposts and comments: WeiboScope only collects the
number of reposts and comments at the end of observation, while these
numbers might change over the time. Thus the number of reposts and
comments analyzed in this dissertation might have been biased toward
the values at the end of observation. A more precise way of collecting
would be to collect these numbers periodically, so that we could analyze
the number of reposts and comments over time.
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• Downsampling the uncensored posts: We randomly selected about 64K
uncensored posts from the 40M uncensored posts to make the analysis in this
dissertation feasible. This might have biased the results toward the selected
samples, however, this is a valid concern that may apply to any statistical study
that performs downsampling.
• Posts deleted by a “permission denied” message: We only considered
posts that were deleted by a “permission denied” message. We ignored posts
that were deleted by censors using a “Weibo does not exist” message, because
that message may be the result of post deletion by either the system or the user
himself. Since we did not have a feasible way to separate these cases, we only
focused on the posts deleted by a “permission denied” message, as all previous
work does [57, 28, 39, 19]. Thus our results are only applicable to the posts
deleted by a “permission denied” message. Unfortunately there is no feasible
way for us at this point to investigate posts deleted by censors by a “Weibo
does not exist” message based on how the Weibo’s API currently works.

7.2

Future work

The work in this dissertation paves the way for future research into Chinese censorship in social networks in multiple directions. We hope that our collected datasets, i.e.
CCTT14 and CCTI14, can help other researchers to better understand censors’ policies in other Chinese platforms that practice censorship. Thus a potential future
work is to utilize these datasets and the pre-trained models to explore censorship
in other Chinese social networks and then answer the questions like, to what extent
censorship policies overlap between these platforms?
We built a classifier that is able to predict censorship with 76.29% accuracy. A
potential future work would be to extend this model to achieve higher accuracy prob-
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ably by taking into account more variables such as image content, user’s attributes
such as the number of followers, or linguistic features of the text content.
In this work, we ignored images that are screenshots of a text passage. Our initial
investigation showed that around 30% of censored images are screenshots of a text
passage. One possible future work would be to utilize OCR techniques to convert
images to text and then redo our analysis and also investigate whether these images
contain any sensitive keywords compared the uncensored ones. If so, is that why
they are censored?
Our study revealed that the user who posted the content is the major indicator of
censorship among the factors that we considered, and the content is less important.
However, we only took into account the factors that were available to us through
the WeiboScope dataset which was the most comprehensive dataset available to us
at the time of writing this dissertation. This dataset does not provide the number
of followers of a user, number of friends, whether the user is verified, the number
of reposts in different time intervals, etc. Also there is no information about the
three main categories of user that WeiboScope tracks, thus we were not able to perform separate analysis over each set of users. Therefore one possible future research
direction would be to collect a more comprehensive dataset and collect as much information around a user and a post, and then redo our experiments and take into
account factors that were not available to us.

7.3

Contextual considerations

Our results in this dissertation add weight to the existing literature [36, 37] that
suggests that censorship in China has more to do with preventing individuals from
carving out their own spheres of influence than it does with blocking specific content.
Academic studies, both with respect to China and in other contexts of information
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control around the world, should consider factors relating to the user that posted the
content in addition to factors relating to the censored content itself. For example,
factors that should be incorporated into future studies include: the popularity of the
user, if the user’s identity is verified, their geographic location, gender, and so on.
There are different political, legal, and technological angles that can be taken to
address censorship. For example, censorship can be viewed as anti-competitive and
therefore a violation of trade law. Or, where censorship touches on issues such as the
spread of disease or environmental issues there are other angles that the international
community can take towards censorship in that it is affecting public health or the
environment internationally, for example. The motivations of the censors are central
to these types of arguments. Gathering evidence of censorship for relevant categories
will be much more effective if more focus is placed on the users posting the content,
rather than simply focusing on the content itself.
The landscape of social media and related censorship in China is constantly evolving. For example, Sina Weibo was the most popular social media platform at the
time of collecting WeiboScope dataset, but now WeChat is the dominant social network in China, with more than 800 million active users. WeChat has a radically
different model, both in terms of how content is disseminated and how it is censored.
Also, policies such as only allowing users to post if their identity is verified or the
prospect of incorporating social media behavior into “social credit” scores may render censorship more difficult to measure because it becomes more characterized by
self censorship. While the specific data collection methods and platform from our
Weibo data in this dissertation may be less relevant today than when the data was
collected, the machine learning methods and general insights into censor motivations
are more general and can inform future efforts.
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